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“The dodo is extinct because they lost 
multi-domain capability.”
The JAPCC (Joint Air Power Competence Center) hosted a multinational gathering of 
distinguished speakers and panellists at the annual Joint Air and Space Power Confer-
ence in Essen, Germany. The theme of this year’s conference was ‘Shaping NATO for 
Multi-Domain Operations of the Future’, discussed in four themed panels.
The concept of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) has emerged in military thinking in 
recent years. Although there have been no serious efforts to define it precisely so far, there 
is already news that the armed forces of some advanced NATO countries are entering the 
implementation phase.1 
TERMINOLOGY
At the time of writing there is no clear NATO 
definition of the term MDO.2 The NATO 
terminology database defines only the in-
formation technology meaning of the word 
“domain”. However, it specifies the terms 
environment and operational environment, 
which are used by other NATO publications 
as synonyms for the word “domain”. Such 
an interpretation of the word is a mistake 
and misunderstanding of the notion. A closer 
reading and analysis of the definition of the 
term operational environment proves that the 
environment and the operational environment 
cover sea, land, air, space, enemy forces, neutral and friendly forces, populations, gov-
ernmental, non-governmental, international organizations, weather, terrain, electronic and 
chemical defence situation, and information space, etc. The illustration (Figure 1.) shows the 
1 Roblin S. “The US Army’s Experimental ‘Multi-domain’ Units are practicing how to battle Chinese Warships”. 
The National Interest, 11 August 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/us-army’s-experimental-“mul-
ti-domain”-units-are-practicing-how-battle-chinese-warships, Accessed on 12 August 2019.
2 The meeting of the relevant NATO body, the Allied Joint Operational Doctrine Working Group (AJOD WG) 
took place between 15-17th of October, discussed the terminology, the meeting report will be released later.
Environment: The surroundings in which 
an organization operates, including air, 
water, land, natural resources, flora, 
fauna, humans, and their interrelations.
Operational environment: A composite 
of the conditions, circumstances and 
influences that affect the employment of 
capabilities and bear on the decisions  
of the commander.
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difference between environment and domains. Whilst environment contains the cognitive, 
virtual and physical dimensions, domains exist in each environment.3 
This will bring us closer to understanding the concept of multi-domain, that is, a com-
prehensive understanding of how a commander can use the capabilities available to him 
in various domains to operate there, in order to make an impact in the same or in another 
domain. So, part of the operational environment becomes the domain, because that is acces-
sible for military forces and can be used for military operations.
Let us look at how doctrines define the role of the military in their own characteristic 
domain. Maritime power is derived from the ability of a state or non-state actor to use 
the freedom of movement provided by the sea to exert diplomatic, economic, or military 
influence at a time and place of choice. Maritime power has traditionally been employed 
globally to maintain the freedom of navigation essential to the general economic welfare or 
survival of states. Conversely, it has been regularly used to disrupt an opponent’s sea lines 
of communication as part of a wider Allied, joint, or combined operation (AJP-3.1, Allied 
Joint Doctrine for Maritime Operations). Interestingly, we do not find a similar definition 
in NATO’s land operational doctrine. According to Australian land doctrine, however, land 
power encompasses the employment of an array of land capabilities – from Army and across 
government – to achieve specified objectives. The Army must always view itself not in 
terms of simply “winning the land battle”, but as a force capable of exerting land power for 
strategic effect across the modern spectrum of peace, crisis and war. The term land power 
also raises the Army’s concept of itself above this tactical “win the land battle” and accepts 
that the generation of effects on land also has strategic impact. It is multidimensional: land 
power may involve the employment of capabilities from all the domains (land, sea, air, space 
and cyberspace) to achieve results on land (extracted from Australian Land Doctrine). Air 
Force refers to the ability to use air capabilities to influence the behaviour of actors and the 
course of events (AJP-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations). As we can 
see, it is only the Australian land doctrine, which mentions that the land-based armed forces 
do not operate in isolation but focus their efforts from all the domains on the land domain.4 
Such a poorly defined and therefore ineffective operation and cooperation of NATO 
forces risks the Alliance’s inability to co-ordinate joint operations in all domains. Particular-
ly critical is the neglect of the non-physical (cyber) domain.
Obviously, today even the simplest military operations require a cross-domain interac-
tion. A land operation without air support is no longer conceivable, and certain land capabil-
ities (marines and Special Forces) have long been integrated into the surface and sub-surface 
elements of naval forces and into air forces. Nevertheless, there is no trace of this multi-do-
main thinking in any current doctrine.
In the absence of a clear definition of the MDO, NATO could take the advanced con-
cepts of the United States (US) and the unclear terminology therein. “Operations conduct-
ed across multiple domains and contested spaces to overcome an adversary’s (or enemy’s) 
strengths by presenting them with several operational and/or tactical dilemmas through 
3 Grest, H. and Heren, H. “What is a Multi-Domain Operation?” In Shaping NATO for Multi-Domain Operations 
of the Future: JAPCC Conference Read Ahead. Kalkar: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2019. 2. https://
www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_Read_Ahead_2019.pdf
4 Parkinson, J. “Is fluidity the key to effective Multi-Domain Operations?” In Shaping NATO for Multi-Domain 
Operations of the Future: JAPCC Conference Read Ahead. Kalkar: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2019. 
39. https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_Read_Ahead_2019.pdf
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the combined application of calibrated force 
posture; employment of multi-domain forma-
tions; and convergence of capabilities across 
domains, environments, and functions in time 
and spaces to achieve operational and tac-
tical objectives.” This definition is bleeding 
from many wounds and does not meet the standards of NATO terminology. It is voluminous, 
contains reference to itself, and excessively narrows the concept, practically defines doctri-
nal thought, and despite its length does not contain enough specificity to distinguish it from 
many other similar concepts (e.g.: joint operations, network-based operation). The United 
States Air Force Command approaches the issue from a command and control perspective, 
having produced a definition only for Multi-Domain Command and Control (C2). “The 
coordinated execution of authority and direction to gain, fuse, and exploit information from 
any source to integrate planning and synchronize execution of Multi-Domain Operations 
in time, space and purpose to meet the commander’s objectives.” From the definition it can 
be concluded that the MDO differs from the previous concept of Allied Joint Operations. 
Indeed, the definition of Allied Joint Operations does not explicitly require the forces partic-
ipating in the operations to cooperate closely. The MDO, on the other hand, goes far beyond 
this point and requires the military to cooperate beyond operational planning to combine 
combat effects. The extent to which the MDO concept goes beyond current joint operations 
is an open question at this time. MDO means mutual support in the traditional operational 
environment of traditional military forces (land, sea, air) and enters into new domains, such 
as cyberspace and space.
Studying the doctrines in AJP-3.20 we 
can find a domain definition. “A discrete 
sphere of military activity within which tacti-
cal actions are orchestrated to achieve objec-
tives in support of the mission. They provide 
a structural framework for military operations 
and wider defence activity. They may be inte-
grated but have no hierarchy. While the activity is discrete the consequences and effects are 
interconnected.” On the basis of the above definition, NATO’s proposed definition (in text 
box) was submitted to the Allied Joint Operational Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG). 
The United States (US) TRADOC headquarters adds to this definition a list of the domains: 
land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace through the electromagnetic spectrum.
Of the five domains, the cyber domain is 
prominent, since it connects the other four. 
Only through networked information technol-
ogy devices can the commander understand 
the evolved air, sea, land and space situation, 
and can process, interpret, control and influ-
ence the platforms in other domains.
There are also opinions to extend the 
concept of a domain to a sixth space, such as the “independent sphere of military activity”, 
which is the cognitive (information, psychological, human, communication) domain. It is 
argued whether recent counter-insurgency operations have proved that the operations must 
first and foremost win the support of the population and that not even the most pressing 
Multinational joint operation:  
An operation carried out by forces of two 
or more nations, in which elements of at 
least two services participate.
Domain: A discrete sphere of military 
activity within which tactical actions 
are orchestrated to achieve objectives 
in support of the mission. (Terminology 
Tracking Form No 2018-0276)
Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)  
“An operation to conduct activities and 
generate effects across more than one 
domain, at the same time in an integrated 
manner”. (TTF-2019-0229)
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firepower can prevent the insurgents from delivering their messages (narratives of actual 
war events) faster and more effectively. Indeed, on many occasions, news of extraordinary 
collateral damage first appeared in the insurgents’ narrative in the world press, and the of-
ficial NATO announcement, the refutation, came only weeks or months later, when both 
world and local public opinion were convinced that NATO soldiers committed murders. The 
MDO must be viable and applicable not only in high-intensity, symmetric warfare, but also 
in low-intensity, asymmetric conditions. Opponents of the Sixth Domain, on the other hand, 
argue that the cognitive is heavily subordinated to the cyber domain, since information is 
from that domain and they consider the cognitive a dimension rather than a domain.5
Figure 1 The five domains in the three dimensions6
The figure above points out that the three dimensions (physical, virtual and cognitive) 
are overarching the five domains. The “old style” battles concentrated effort mostly in phys-
ical domains (land, maritime, air) and dimensions, meanwhile the “new school” has to ad-
dress all the domains and all the dimensions simultaneously.
HISTORY
These domains, have always existed, even the ancient warlords were already doing multi-do-
main operations, coordinating the manoeuvre of their ground troops with naval manoeuvres. 
The disastrous Athenian campaign to conquer Sicily during the Peloponnesian War provides 
just one example. In 414 BC during the siege of Syracuse, the Spartan strategist Gylippus 
turned the tide of battle in favour of the Syracusan forces. Gylippus focused initially on the 
human and political factors, inspiring the Syracusan forces and galvanizing the support of 
their allies. He then embarked upon simultaneous attacks of the Athenian troops on the land 
and at sea. By 413 BC, the Athenians had been defeated.7 
5 Canovas, J. “Multi-Domain Operations and Challenges to Air Power”. In Shaping NATO for Multi-Domain 
Operations of the Future: JAPCC Conference Read Ahead. Kalkar: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2019. 
48. https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_Read_Ahead_2019.pdf
6 Ducheine, P. “NATO’s challenges in Multi-Domain aka Full Spectrum Operations, presentation.”
7 Reilly, J. M. “Multi-Domain Operations”. In Shaping NATO for Multi-Domain Operations of the Future: 
JAPCC Conference Read Ahead. Kalkar: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2019. 16-17. https://www.japcc.
org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_Read_Ahead_2019.pdf
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Did the air count as a domain in this campaign? Or was subsurface water a domain in 
this case? Certainly not, since Gylippus could not manoeuvre in the air or under the sea and 
could not achieve any effect in them. Why and when does an existing physical space (air) 
become a domain? When the first aircraft entered service, it became immediately clear that 
aviation as a capability was essential for freedom of movement and therefore it was impera-
tive to gain air superiority. In the same way, the deployment of submarines changed the na-
ture of two-dimensional naval warfare into three dimensional. This also leads to a practical 
definition of the domain: “The critical macro space to which access and control is vital for 
freedom of operations and therefore superiority therein must be achieved.” As the first sput-
nik was launched, space became the fourth domain. And since the introduction of networked 
information technology in the military, it has become clear that cyberspace is the fifth one.
The discovery of new domains of warfare has certainly brought the need for unified 
control of manoeuvre in the various domains. While in the Korean War it was enough to 
break down force cooperation into days and hours, the concept of Air-land Battle, which was 
created in the 1980s, required minutes of precision in collaboration between the domains. 
The MDO requires that sensors transmit data in seconds and that a strike from one domain 
to another occurs within a fraction of a second.
CHALLENGES
Potential future adversaries of NATO have developed technologies, strategies, and opera-
tional doctrines that allow them to fight asymmetrically against the Alliance’s military supe-
riority and create a strategic deadlock with attacks from different domains.
The revolutionary disruptive technologies causing the stalemate include newly devel-
oped devices, such as ballistic and supersonic missiles, stealth cruise missiles, unmanned 
aerial vehicles that can be bought commercially and not only for observation and detection, 
but also for delivering strikes. Continuing the line is high-energy microwave weapons and 
nuclear weapons that destroy all electrical equipment in a district, without leaving signifi-
cant radiation behind. In addition, the latter weapon can produce effects in two domains at 
the same time: blasting a 1 kT nuclear weapon 400 km above the surface could significantly 
damage or permanently destroy unprotected electrical devices and disrupt the power grids 
and satellites in space. In parallel with these developments, the potential adversary can en-
hance the protection of his own air defence systems against electronic suppression by using 
passive sensors.8 
China is making huge efforts to control cyberspace. A decisive Chinese superiority 
gained in this domain would mean that NATO could not see and hear, and would lose its abil-
ity to control its weapon systems in a timely and accurate manner. Consequently, initiative 
will be lost and ultimately NATO’s superiority in all other domains would be neutralized.
The domains are interrelated and the effect created in one will definitely have an effect 
in the other domains. For example, if the opponent intercepted or interfered with the fre-
quencies used to control the satellites, destroyed the ground station controlling satellite, or 
blinded the satellite itself with concentrated energy beam, it would have a serious impact on 
the fight in other domains. Plenty of naval and land based communication and navigation 
systems, weapons systems would be paralyzed, the capacity of satellite detection and early 
8 Reilly. “Multi-Domain Operations”. 18.
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warning systems would disappear, complete weapon systems would get unserviceable with-
out accurate positioning. Ships, airplanes and entire land units would lose orientation, the 
ability of accurate knowledge of each other’s position, ability to effectively fire, and even 
command and control. Commanders will be forced to manage their subordinates in a “mis-
sion command” manner, with little or no feedback from the subordinates.
With the spread of the technology needed to dominate cyber domain, the Alliance finds 
it increasingly difficult to maintain its dominance in this domain. Many are already ques-
tioning whether the Alliance would be able to sustain cyber space superiority permanently 
and universally. Such an expansion of the capabilities of potential adversaries will change 
the nature of warfare.
REQUIREMENTS
Such a dramatic change in the operational environment places many demands on NATO to 
meet new challenges and succeed in fighting (or deterring) near peer enemy forces.
•  The first requirement is a new, higher level implementation of the oft-mentioned mis-
sion command. In the future operating environment NATO will have no superiority in the 
electromagnetic spectrum, and communications and IT networks will become unreliable. 
Commanders have to upgrade the “centralized decision-making, decentralized implemen-
tation” to “distributed control, decentralized implementation.” The details of this type of 
C2 are not clear at this moment.9
•  Commanders must be familiar with the idea that in the future theatre of operation they will 
have no more comfortable superiority in any of the domains. The loss of aerial and elec-
tronic superiority will be extremely sensitive to NATO forces, because they did not have to 
face such a challenge in the past 60 years, since the Korean War.
•  The third requirement is the elimination of the so-called independent (stovepipe) service 
thinking. The new concept should be based on the interconnection of the five operational 
domains, their mutual support, and the operational effects among the domains. The effects 
achieved in each domain must support those in other domains, and create synergies in a 
complex, all-domain environment. The supporting and supported relationship will change 
constantly as agile commanders execute strikes from one domain into another. The de-
cisive strike will not occur in one or in another domain, but almost simultaneously in all 
domains.10
•  The fourth requirement is that it is not enough for NATO to win the war, but it has to be 
prepared to win the peace. Moreover, ideally, like the in the Cold War, there will be no 
armed conflict between NATO and near-peer armies, but NATO’s preparedness itself will 
be sufficient to deter the war. Armies are capable of winning battles and campaigns, but 
only a committed, whole-of-government policy can win both the war and peace. Isolated 
military results without other aspects of national power of the member states are not capa-
ble of winning the competition against Russia or China.
•  The fifth requirement is to find the opportunity for NATO to have proportionate capabili-
ties in all the five domains. While NATO has significant capabilities in physical domains, 
9 Reilly. “Multi-Domain Operations”. 22.
10 Carlisle, H. J. “The complexity of the Multi-Domain Operations”. In Shaping NATO for Multi-Domain Opera-
tions of the Future: JAPCC Conference Read Ahead. Kalkar: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2019. 33-37. 
https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_Read_Ahead_2019.pdf
75Forum & Reviews
NATO’s cyber and space capabilities are currently based solely on voluntary contributions 
from member nations. Most of the Member States do not have any offensive cyber capabil-
ities at all. The problem does not only arise in the field of capability development. The use 
of space and cyberspace for military purposes raises enormous legal concerns as well. Un-
less these are addressed and satisfactorily resolved, we risk yielding the two domains that 
link the other three, thus making our capabilities isolated and easy to counter. However, 
the use of these two key domains is not a legal challenge for Russia and China. Collective 
cyber-defence (including cyber-attacks) is currently prohibited under positive internation-
al law.11 The dominance of space and cyberspace will be vital to NATO, the superiority 
gained in these two domains does not necessarily mean victory over the other three spaces, 
but their loss is certainly a defeat.
•  The biggest challenge of MDO is to bring together the five domains, to develop an op-
eration control system that not only integrates service-based operations centres, but also 
enables the commander to visualize operations and make quick decisions.
OPPORTUNITIES
John Boyd’s OODA cycle (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) helps develop the C2 gov-
ernance system. The idea is that a Multi-Domain Operations Centre (MDOC) consists of 
three layers. The first is perception (reconnaissance and intelligence), which allows the com-
mander to understand the operational environment, and to explore the relationships among 
domains, the second one is the command and control layer. The commander must be mindful 
of the varying operational tempo and significance of the domains, the light infantry and spe-
cial operations forces are capable of traveling at 3-4 km, the mechanized, airborne and naval 
forces reach their destination much faster, the air force is moving at the speed of sound, 
cyber operations are practically at the speed of light. MDOCs should coordinate multi-do-
main operations so that they exert their effects almost simultaneously, thereby achieving 
a complex effect that prevents the enemy from responding adequately. The dominance of 
cyber and electromagnetic domains is of paramount importance. Without protecting our own 
networks, NATO forces become out of control, and by gaining and establishing superiority 
in these two domains, we can deprive the enemy of perceiving and communicating. Finally 
comes the effect layer, which includes battlefield systems that generate kinetic and non-ki-
netic as well as information effects.12
Here is a possible scenario for demonstrating multi-domain operations. Internet attacks 
and operations with electronic jamming equipment (cyber domain) have successfully para-
lyzed the enemy’s integrated air defence system, allowing NATO’s reconnaissance aircraft 
(air domain) to fly over and detect enemy strategic targets. According to the information 
transmitted, the MDOC directs a submarine fire a Tomahawk missile (sea domain) onto the 
enemy satellite command centre (space domain) in order to paralyse its communication and 
real time satellite reconnaissance system. The MDOC simultaneously launches an amphib-
ious operation (land domain), taking possession of the enemy’s commercial port, thereby 
cutting off his economic influence.
11 Väljataga, A. “Tracing opinio juris in National Cyber Security Strategy Documents.” In Shaping NATO for 
Multi-Domain Operations of the Future: JAPCC Conference Read Ahead. Kalkar: Joint Air Power Competence 
Centre, 2019. 91-97. https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_Read_Ahead_2019.pdf
12 Carlisle. “The complexity of the Multi-Domain Operations”. 35.
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In the example above, each operation initiated from a domain exerts a decisive effect in 
another domain, and thereby prepares the next operation. The tempo and co-ordination of 
operations deprive the enemy of his vital skills almost simultaneously and present him with 
so many problems mutually reinforcing each other’s influence that the enemy is unable to 
prepare and respond adequately.
The current joint force C2 systems are not appropriate for such an operational tem-
po. What we call joint operations today are in reality nothing more than the coordination 
of single-domain operations, timing their successive sequences without even attempting to 
exploit cross-domain strikes in order to mutually support each other. Authority is delegated 
to the lowest operationally competent level possible, in order to prepare future battlefield 
commanders to command by mission orders, leave their subordinate commanders to decide 
within their specified limits and constrains, and leave them to plan and execute cross-domain 
strikes.13 
The new dimension of mission command 
leadership is called distributed control, and 
this is how MDC2 was defined. Distributed 
control and decentralized implementation 
allow for shorter chain of command, faster 
decision making, and significant C2 benefits. 
At this moment, we have neither definition of 
distributed control nor description the con-
cept of it.
The key to MDOC2 is connecting and sharing information at the highest possible speed 
in real time. C2 relies on a cloud-based database into which all information collected by 
sensors from each domain is uploaded. This allows a reduction of the time needed for target-
ing and delivering strikes. In the complex process of targeting, automated and IT-supported 
processes immediately determine what action the Rules of Engagement allow. They also 
determine what collateral damage (?) and what primary and secondary effects are expected, 
and in which domain (or domains) which weapon systems are best suited to attack the target. 
This allows the commander, in his or her delegated powers, to take advantage of the short 
time the target is exposed and instantly strike from as many domains as possible and by the 
most appropriate platforms.
It is important that data are shared as widely as possible and that the electromagnetic 
spectrum remains secure. This requires NATO to develop new data sharing mechanisms and 
standards as well as encryption mechanisms for the multi-domain network. There is a lot to 
do in this regard, as it is not just a technological issue. For nations, sharing information also 
raises legal and political issues.
The continuous operation of networks requires the networks necessary for MDO to 
operate not on a server-client basis, but as a peer-to-peer system capable of self-healing. In 
case of disruption or destruction of certain network elements, other elements of the network 
take over their role and pass the necessary information to the recipient. The development of 
technology makes this possible.
The basic principle of information sharing (“need to know”) has to be replaced by a new 
approach, which recognizes that there is much more risk in keeping back information within 
13 Canovas. “Multi-Domain Operations and Challenges to Air Power”. 49.
Multi-Domain Command and Control 
(MDC2): Command and control that 
directs and enables the simultaneous 
conduct of multiple operations across 
more than one domain in an integrated 
manner.
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the Alliance than in potentially unnecessary information sharing. A concept of analysing 
and interpreting large amounts of data generated in the network needs to be developed. The 
potential of artificial intelligence for automated data processing and machine learning has 
to be utilized. The use of these revolutionary disruptive technologies would also be of enor-
mous advantage to our enemies, so we must take immediate action to be able to counteract 
this advantage first and neutralize this advantage when it appears in the arsenals of China 
and Russia.14 
Science provides an inexhaustible range of combat capabilities. It is no longer a dream 
to have a machine-to-human interface. In the future, commanders will be able to control 
many command and weapon systems at the same time simply by brains or eyes.
Staying on track, NATO’s MDO training environment will need to be developed in the 
future. A virtual environment should be created where future MDO theory can be put into 
practice. There is a need for a computer simulation infrastructure where our MD concepts 
can be tested. Multiple-level MDO attacks must be simulated, based on the potential real 
enemy’s doctrine. The exercise scenarios have to contain deprivation of superiority in one 
or more domains. Regaining lost superiority and subsequent decisive strikes must also be 
exercised. The MDO should be tested not only in high-intensity combat, but also in hybrid 
warfare, proxy war, anti-insurgency scenarios. Efforts should be made to reflect not only the 
impact on the enemy during the war, but the activities of a wide range of state (police, mili-
tia), international (Red Cross) and non-state actors (ethnic groups, criminals) should be also 
simulated. Ownership of the space domain is crucial, and such scenarios should be injected 
into exercises as well.
SUMMARY
Huge efforts are being made by NATO and its member states to prepare for the fight against 
near-peer forces. The new concept is called multi-domain, and it represents an evolution 
from the previous joint operation concept. In MDO new disruptive technological tools and 
procedures are widely used. The conference supported our effort in the given concept de-
velopment task, we were able to expand the community of interest, and we received inputs 
about the opportunities to address in the future. 
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